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INTRODUCTION

In a provocative and engaging 2007 article in the Buffalo Law Review,
Professor Mae Kuykendall asserts (among other things) that "the underlying
project of generating wealth does not produce rich human stories."' At a
macro level, Professor Kuykendall indeed seems to be correct-it's all
about money and not people 2-and the stories have little entertainment value.3 But her contention and her overall conclusion in the article marginalize
the utility of business law narratives and may tend to discourage those who
strive to more closely connect business law and narrative.' I remain un1. Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The MarginalRole of Narrativein Corporate
Law, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 537, 555 (2007). She later expands:
The principal character in the story of corporate law is capital, its imperatives
and its power to alter cultures and create wealth. The plot is change of such daily
mass as to defy a chronicle. The human element recedes in the face of the story of
money, even where we know that human dramas and personal motives may abound. So they do. But they are not what the field concerns itself with. That human
stories lack point in business law is neither good nor bad. It is simply the way it is.
Id. at 607 (footnote omitted).
2. See id at 606-08.
3. See id. at 552-53 (noting business narratives' failure to entertain, concluding that
"business is dull"). A colleague aptly notes that money and people can coexist amicably in
engaging narratives, citing to Charles Dickens's Bleak House and HardTimes as well-known
examples.
4. Professor Kuykendall defines narrative as "an account of what recognizable
characters say and do, with a time sequence that lends support to depictions of cause and
effect, motives and consequences." Id. at 542. Others define narrative in somewhat different
ways. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 141,
147 (1997) ("We use the term 'narrative' to signify a broader enterprise that encompasses the
recounting (production) and receiving (reception) of stories. This enterprise functions to
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Notwithstanding Professor Kuykendall's welldaunted, however.
researched and eloquently stated thesis and conclusions, her article does not
portend the death of business law narratives. This Paper proclaims that
business law narratives are alive and well and useful to both the understanding and reform of legal doctrine.'
Legal discourse is the heart of law's scholarship, teaching, and practice. Narrative is an essential element of this discourse.' The telling and retelling of legally relevant stories has the capacity to enrich the discourse
about law and legal process. More specifically, analogizing law stories to
more familiar non-law stories (including those from literature) can be a powerful way to afford law stories more narrative coherence, more easily illustrating the actual and desired content of law. Moreover, this type of narrative comparison and contrast can be used as inspiration for legal scholarship' and as a teaching device to connect students to theory, policy, doctrine, legally relevant facts, and even the relationship of law to society.' By
organize certain kinds of problems into a form that renders culturally meaningful both the
problems and their possible resolutions."). Any of these definitions suffice for purposes of
this Paper.
5. My views are apparently shared by others, given that this symposium issue
includes numerous other papers that connect (in various ways) narrative to business law. See
also Nancy B. Rapoport, Where Have All the (Legal) Stories Gone?, M/E INSIGHTS, Fall
2009, at 7, 8, available at http://www.theamec.com/pdf/insights/ME InsightsFall2009.pdf
(describing ways in which business law narratives can be useful to "budding transactional
lawyers").
6. Discourse exists "[w]henever one can describe, between a number of statements,
such a system of dispersion, [or] whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or
thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations) . . . ." MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 38 (R.

D. Laing ed., A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969). In Foucault's
construct, narrative is a form of statement or "[elnunciative [m]odalit[y]." Id. at 50. Accordingly, in this Paper, I treat narrative as an element of discourse.
7. See Amy Vorenberg, The Moral of the Story: The Power of Narrative to Inspire
and Sustain Scholarship (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8. See Carolyn Grose, StorytellingAcross the Curriculum:From Marginto Center,
from Clinic to the Classroom (William Mitchell Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
126,
Sept.
5,
2009),
available
at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1469028. Because this Paper uses a narrative from the Bible, it may
be situated in part in law and literature scholarship. Id. at 5. In a recent paper, a proponent
of law and literature scholarship offers that "studying literary texts-fictional, dramatic,
cinematic, or poetic works, of the high or low variety-in relation to and alongside of law,
can benefit some of our students very much." Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Law, Literature, and
Interdisciplinary Copia: A Response to Skeptics 2-3 (Sept. 27, 2009) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1479270.

See also THOMAS MORAWETZ, LITERATURE AND

THE LAW xx (2007) ("Literature can be the vital corrective in a legal education that allows us
to see all of law's facets."). Storytelling is not, but perhaps should be, taught in law schools
and other professional education programs. See Hollywood's Peter Guber: Spinning Memos
into

Tales,

KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,

July

15,

http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa-viewArticle&id=1748&language=

2009,

(noting
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using narratives, including those from literature, in law-teaching we also
may be teaching students, through modeling, how to successfully and unsuccessfully employ narratives and other communication skills in their practice.' There are valuable narratives in business law that can be used in these
ways to facilitate achievement of these objectives.
To illustrate this point (and the overall importance of business law
narratives to the discourse on corporate and securities law in a corporate
governance context), this Paper narrates a biblical story-Eve's ingestion of
the forbidden fruit-and analogizes it to a recent business law story that I
explore in my scholarship and use in my teaching-Martha Stewart's sale of
ImClone stock as alleged insider trading. The analogy, while imperfect,
helps expose interesting (even if not novel) questions about the descriptive
and normative content of U.S. insider trading law and related legal process
issues. This analogy is illustrated in Part I, which tells Eve's story and Martha's story, in turn, in a parallel fashion. Part II then identifies key similarities and differences in their stories as they relate to insider trading regulation in the United States and makes relevant observations. As a result of the
relative clarity and simplicity of the biblical story and text as contrasted
with the somewhat murky, complex story of Stewart's asserted wrongful
conduct, the analysis in Part II is heavily weighted toward the Stewart story.
Part III then offers a conclusion on the relationship of the two narratives to
the overall discourse on U.S. insider trading regulation and the value of
narrative in law teaching.
Peter Guber's observation that "We don't teach it in medical school. We don't teach it in
law school. Most of the teaching is content regurgitation, not about emotional resonance ...
. But you have to move people's hearts before you move their wallet or their minds."); Rapoport, supra note 5, at 8-10 (explaining why law schools might want to teach storytelling
and assessing the barriers to making that happen).
9. See MORAWETZ, supra note 8, at xx-xxii (noting that students can acquire good
writing skills and narrative abilities by studying law and literature); Grose, supra note 8, at
29 (referencing lawyers' "roles as storytellers and constructors of stories, based on their
client's point of view and goals"); Rapoport, supra note 5, at 7 ("Really good lawyersespecially litigators-know that the 'story' shapes everything: from the way that the lawyer
goes about developing the case to the way that the lawyer drafts the pleadings and even all
the way to trial or settlement of the case."). Of course, we commonly think of storytelling as
a trial lawyer's stock-in-trade. But stories also can be useful in the boardroom and in other
legal practice contexts.
Law is made through the telling and believing of stories. Thus, all lawyering
involves some kind of persuasion, and all persuasion involves some kind of storytelling. In order to be effective professionals, therefore, lawyers need to know how
to construct and tell stories. That means they need to recognize stories as constructed, and they need to recognize themselves as constructors of stories. Law
teachers, therefore, need to help law students develop these skills across the curriculum; because they are skills lawyers need to use in all facets of their practice in
order to be responsible effective professionals.
Grose, supra note 8, at 29. See also Rapoport,supra note 5, at 8.
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I. OF EVE AND MARTHA
At their respective cores, my narratives about Eve and Martha are stories of women falling from grace."o At the outset of each narrative, each
woman had had an advantaged status in her community. As a result of that
advantaged status, each was tempted into alleged rule-breaking by another
member of that community. And in each case, the result was enforcement
against the woman that relates to her individual, advantaged position. In
these respects, the stories are comparable and part of a larger literature highlighting substantially similar themes." Yet, in the end, I am much more
certain that Eve actually has committed a wrongful act under applicable
rules than that Martha Stewart has committed a wrongful act under applicable rules, which leads me to further question the efficacy of current insider
trading regulation and enforcement in the United States. The two tales offer
a new way to expose undesirable uncertainties in U.S insider trading regulation. Here is how the two stories unfold, as I see them.
A. Eve Eats the Forbidden Fruit
1. Basic BackgroundFacts
Eve, then the only woman on Earth, was created by God from Adam's
rib (as he sleeps) to serve as his helper. 2 One day, she sets forth into the
10. Surely, there is a feminist tale to be told here-including that of male-dominated
rulemakers and enforcement agents causing the fall of women who threaten their male power
base and the resulting gender-infused schadenfreude-the joy experienced from another's
misfortune. But that is not the focus of this work, and so that narrative must wait for another
day. In addressing the stories of Eve and Martha in an overall gender-neutral manner, I may
be accused of perpetuating a tradition of ignoring or minimizing the potential role of gender
in business law narratives. See Kuykendall, supra note 1, at 584 ("[C]ases today overlook
the gender of the participants, both in terms of assigning significance to their gender and in
terms of narrative conventions that trigger narrative tension. Only a determined reader may
assign significance to the gender of the participants that the judicial authors do not explore or
even foreground with narrative tension.").
11.
In this Paper, I focus on The Bible, John Milton's ParadiseLost, and the Stewart
story. However, many other literary narratives cover all or some of these themes. See, e.g.,
DANTE ALIGHIERI, DIvINE COMEDY: THE INFERNO (2d ed., London, Chapman & Hall 1867)
(Inferno); NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Cambridge, Riverside Press
1893) (1850); NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, Rappaccini's Daughter, in HAWTHORNE'S, MOSSES
FROM AN OLD MANSE 100 (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1894) (1854). Song lyrics also pick
up on these themes from the story in Genesis: "Woke this morning to the stinging lash /
Every man rise from the ash / Each betrayal begins with trust / Every man returns to dust."
PHISH, Farmhouse, on FARMHOUSE (Elektra 2000), lyrics available at http://www.sing365.
com/music/lyric.nsflFarmhouse-lyrics-Phish/ECElB62CAAFCBBFE48256BFOOO 18EF2.
12. Genesis 2:18-22. See also JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 177-78 (Scott Elledge
ed., 1975) (Book VIII, lines 437-77). All biblical citations in this Paper reference the Revised Standard Version.
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Garden of Eden with knowledge that she could eat the fruit of any tree in
the garden except the beautiful, prominent, centrally located "tree of the
knowledge of good and evil."l 3 Adam had been told, and Eve understood,
that the ingestion of the fruit of this special tree would or could result in
death. 1
2. The Temptation and the Related Conduct
In the garden that day, Eve met up with the serpent." The serpent inquired about God's rule, asking whether God had said Eve could not eat
from any of the trees in the garden." Eve faithfully informed the serpent of
her understanding of the rules about eating the fruit of these trees, including
the prohibition on eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil." The serpent, knowing full well that he was cleverly encouraging Eve
to break God's rules, convinced Eve that she would not die if she ate the
fruit of the tree of knowledge and evil." In fact, the serpent informed Eve
that eating of the fruit of the tree would afford her God's knowledge of
good and evil." Enticed with this new information and the attractive nature
of the fruit and the tree, Eve ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good
and evil and lost her innocence.20
3. The Enforcement Actions
When God learned of the violation, He cursed the serpent, relegated
him to a life of moving along the ground on his belly and eating dust, and

13. Genesis 2:17, 3:2-3. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 192-93 (Book IX, lines
378-403).
14. Genesis 2:16-17, 3:2-3. Interestingly, we are not told in the Bible how Eve
learns the rule. And in repeating it to the serpent in this Bible passage, she both changes and
expands upon it. God tells Adam, in Genesis 2:16-17: "You may freely eat of every tree of
the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day
that you eat of it you shall die." When Eve repeats the rule to the serpent, she says: "God
said, 'You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, neither
shall you touch it, lest you die."' Genesis 3:3. Eve's articulation of the rule, which uses the
word "lest" (typically meaning "in case" or "for fear that") indicates less certainty about the
timing and actual realization of death. Moreover, Eve adds a prohibition to the rule-that
touching the tree, as well as eating its fruit, is forbidden.
15. Genesis 3:1. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 196 (Book IX, lines 528-48).
16. Genesis 3:1. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 199 (Book IX, lines 655-58).
17. Genesis 3:2-3. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 199 (Book IX, lines 659-63).
18. Genesis 3:4. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 200 (Book IX, lines 683-86).
19. Genesis 3:5. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 200-01 (Book IX, lines 686732).
20. Genesis 3:6-7. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 201-09 (Book IX, lines 7331066).
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foretold future ills to be suffered by the serpent. 21 God also punished Eve
by increasing her pain in childbirth and subjecting her to her husband's
will. 22 Finally, after punishing Adam (who, at Eve's suggestion, also partook of the forbidden fruit23), God banished the couple from the Garden of
Eden."
B. Martha Sells ImClone Shares
1. Basic BackgroundFacts
It was December 27, 2001. Martha Stewart, a woman who had (by
many accounts) "made it" in a man's world, was on her way to Mexico for a
vacation with a friend, Mariana Pasternak.25 As the founder and Chief Executive Officer of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Stewart had
amassed significant wealth. She spent some of these riches in the stock
market." Included in her portfolio on December 27, 2001 were 3,928
shares of common stock of ImClone Systems Incorporated. 27 Although Samuel Waksal, the founder and Chief Executive Officer of ImClone, was
Stewart's friend, she had been trying to dispose of her shares in ImClone
because the investment had not been as successful as she had hoped. In
fact, in November 2001, Stewart had tendered all of her then existing shares
in ImClone to Bristol-Myers Squibb Company." Bristol-Myers only purchased a portion of her shares in that tender offer, leaving her with the 3,928
shares in her portfolio on December 27, 2001.29 On December 21 and 24,
Stewart sold off "loss stocks" in her portfolio, but held onto her ImClone
shares, which were not yet trading at a loss.30

21.

Genesis 3:14-15. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 217 (Book X, lines 163-

22.
23.

Genesis 3:16. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 218 (Book X, lines 193-96).
Genesis 3:6. See also MILTON, supra note 12, at 204-07 (Book IX, lines 856-

81).

1016).
24. Genesis 3:23-24.
25. United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 283 (2d Cir. 2006).
26. Meir Statman, Martha Stewart's Lessons in Behavioral Finance, 7 J.
INVESTMENT CONSULTING 1, 2-3 (2005).
27. See Stewart, 433 F.3d at 282; Statman, supra note 26, at 3 (Table 2).
28. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 282.
29. Id.
30. Statman, supra note 26, at 3. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on
Scienter, in MARTHA STEWART'S LEGAL TROUBLES 233-34 (Joan MacLeod Heminway ed.,
2007) [hereinafter Langevoort, Second Reflections]; Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on
Scienter (and the Securities FraudCase Against Martha Stewart that Never Happened), 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 13 (2006) [hereinafter Langevoort, FirstReflections].
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2. The Temptation andthe Related Conduct
On December 27, 2001, while Martha Stewart was still in transit to
Mexico, she received a call from her stockbroker, Peter Bacanovic (who
also was Sam Waksal's broker and knew of Stewart's friendship with Waksal)." Bacanovic, also on vacation, informed Stewart (in a message left
with her administrative assistant that he (Bacanovic) "thinks ImClone is
going to start trading downward."32 She picked up this message at a stopover in Texas and asked her assistant to put her through to Bacanovic's office." In that call, Stewart, herself a former stockbroker, learned from Bacanovic's assistant, Douglas Faneuil, that Waksal was attempting to sell all
of his ImClone shares, and in that same call, Stewart got a price quote on
the shares.34 She then authorized the sale of her ImClone shares, a sale that
was completed later that day."
3. The Enforcement Actions
Following congressional, agency, and press inquiries and investigations, on June 4, 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") brought a civil enforcement action in federal court against Martha
Stewart and Peter Bacanovic (but not against Douglas Faneuil, who turned
states' evidence) for insider trading violations.36 The asserted violations
were based on Bacanovic's alleged breach of his duties of nondisclosure
under several policies of Bacanovic's employer, Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc.-duties owed to his firm-by telling Stewart about the
attempted and actual sales of ImClone shares by the Waksal family,37 and
Stewart's actual or constructive knowledge of Bacanovic's breach of that
duty at the time she sold her ImClone shares after receiving information
about the attempted and actual Waksal family stock sales.3 8 This action was
not settled until after the conclusion of Stewart's related criminal trial

31. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 282.
32. Id. at 282-83.
33. Id. at 283.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Complaint, SEC v. Stewart, 03 CV 4070 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8169.htm.
37. Id. 16, 29.
38. Id. $117,32.
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(which did not involve an insider trading claim)." In the settlement, both
Stewart and Bacanovic agreed to disgorgement and civil penalties.'
Stewart . . . also agreed to a five year bar from serving as a director of a public
company, and a five year limitation on her service as an officer or employee of a
public company by prohibiting her from participating in certain activities, including financial reporting, financial disclosure, monitoring compliance with the feder41
al securities laws, internal controls, audits or Commission filings.
II. WHAT THE STORIES OF EVE AND MARTHA SAY ABOUT U.S. INSIDER
TRADING REGULATION

Eve and Martha-two important women tempted to engage in activities that bring them under scrutiny for violation of operative rules in their
respective communities. The core similarities in their stories, as well as the
differences in these narratives, encourage certain observations about insider
trading law in the United States. Many types of observations are possible,
including those about the moral roots of or justifications for insider trading
regulation42 and those about the emotional content of insider trading regulation.43 This Paper identifies three key areas for examination: the uncertain
basis for insider trading regulation in the United States; the lack of clarity of
the content of the elements necessary for insider trading liability in the
United States; and the fairness and appropriateness of insider trading enforcement activities. While many of the observations made here are not
new, by anchoring a discussion of insider trading in the Martha Stewart case
to a more familiar tale, the various points of critique may be made clearer.
A. The Basis for Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, Like That
for Regulating Consumption of the Forbidden Fruit, Is Uncertain
First, I compare the policy underpinnings and other possible objectives
of the rules at issue in the stories of Eve and Martha. The precise bases of
the two rules are elusive. Neither God (as to the prohibition on consump39. Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic Agree to Settle SEC Insider Trading
Charges, SEC Litigation Release No. 19794 (Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2006/rl9794.htm.
40. See id
4 1. Id.
42. See Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REv. 375 (1999) (exploring the moral and legal duty to disclose information
about a security before trading that security in the market and proposing a related unifying
theory of insider trading regulation).
43. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading, in MARTHA STEWART'S
LEGAL TROUBLEs 299 (Joan MacLeod Heminway ed., 2007) (exploring jealousy and envy as
"passions" underlying different types of U.S. insider trading regulation, using the Martha
Stewart case as an example).
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tion of the forbidden fruit) nor U.S. federal rulemakers in Congress, the
SEC, or the federal courts (as to the prohibitions on insider trading) has
articulated a clear vision of the rationale for its respective rules. This continuing foundational uncertainty affords both rules questionable legitimacy,
compromising the possibility of compliance.
1. The UncertainBasis for Regulating Consumption of the Forbidden
Fruit
Why does God prohibit Adam and Eve from eating the forbidden
fruit? What harm does God intend to prevent? What objectives does He
intend His rule to serve?
The relevant passages from the Book of Genesis are short on many details, among them the basis for God's prohibition on eating the forbidden
fruit." Was God's purpose to preserve the immortality or innocence of
Adam and Eve?45 Did He want to keep them from obtaining the knowledge
of good and evil?46 Perhaps God imposed the rule as a means of giving
Adam and Eve the opportunity to make a conscious choice between ignorant immortality and knowledgeable humanness.47
God's rationale for His rule is wholly ambiguous from the text of the
Bible, and history offers us no other text to which we can turn for definitive
guidance. One commentator has termed God's rule "unserious," "irrational[]," and "ethically arbitrary."48
44. R. W. L. MOBERLY, THE THEOLOGY OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS 79 (2009) ("It is
noteworthy that God does not explain or justify . .. the prohibition, with warning, of eating
from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad.").
45. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Investments, Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEX. L. REV. 559, 613-14 (1994)
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)).
46. James Barr, Is God A Liar? (Genesis 2-3)-And Related Matters, 57 J.
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 1, 3 (2006) (asking the same question).
47. Cf JAMES L. KUGEL, How To READ THE BIBLE: A GUIDE TO SCRIPTURE, THEN
AND Now 47-57 (2007) (describing various interpretations of Genesis 1-3 that encompass
these possibilities, among others); Greenwood, supra note 45, at 613-15 (describing two
alternative, opposing views of the effects of eating the forbidden fruit: the fall of humanity
and humanity's acquisition of wisdom).
48. See also supra text accompanying note 47 (quoting in various places from the
author's book, JAMES BARR, THE GARDEN OF EDEN AND THE HOPE OF IMMORTALITY (Fortress
Press 1993) (1992)). See also MOBERLY, supra note 44, at 76 (same). As a result of incongruities in the early part of Genesis, certain Gnostic Christians and others believe that Eve's
story should be interpreted in light of the experience of the reader rather than read literally.
See ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT 63-64 (1988).

These Gnostic interpreta-

tions provide multiple rationales for God's rule, perhaps most compellingly portraying God's
rule as a means of exposing human frailties-a rule meant to be violated by Adam and Eve
to make a larger point about inherent human choices between good and evil, safety and
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2. The UncertainBasisfor U.S. Insider Trading Regulation
U.S. insider trading regulation may be subject to criticisms similar to
those of God's mandate to not eat the forbidden fruit. What makes insider
trading illegal in the United States? What harms do Congress, the SEC, and
the federal courts intend to prevent? What objectives do these rulemakers
intend to serve in their regulation of insider trading activity?
Insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended ("Section 10(b)"),49 and the SEC's Rule lOb-5 adopted
under Section 10(b) ("Rule lOb-5")o is a type of securities fraud. The deception that is requisite to securities fraud liability occurs in insider trading
when an officer, director, or other insider trades while in possession of material nonpublic information in violation of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty
of trust and confidence.5 Under various theories, the duty may be owed
directly or indirectly, actually or practically, to shareholders, the source of
the information, or (potentially) others.52 Under the government's theory in
its case against Martha Stewart, for example, Peter Bacanovic breached his
duty of trust and confidence to Merrill Lynch by improperly usingmisappropriating-material, nonpublic information about the Waksal stock
sales to "tip" information to Stewart, making Bacanovic liable as a misappropriator/tipper." Stewart's liability as a tippee in trading her ImClone
shares derives from her knowledge of the existence and breach of Bacanovic's duty to Merrill Lynch.54
Accordingly, insider trading is not illegal strictly because of the unfairness of trading by one who possesses confidential information in an environment of information asymmetry.55 Rather, insider trading in the United
States is illegal because it is deceptive as a betrayal of a relationship of trust
and confidence relating to material nonpublic information about a corpora-

knowledge, or free will and subservience, and about humanity's innate moral and spiritual
failings. Id. at 74. See also supra text accompanying note 47; WILLARD GAYLIN, ADAM AND
EvE AND PINOCCHIO: ON BEING AND BECOMING HUMAN 47-49 (1990).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
50.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980).
51.
52. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Was Martha Stewart Targeted?, in MARTHA
STEWART's LEGAL TROUBLES 6-8 (Joan MacLeod Heminway ed., 2007) [hereinafter Heminway, Targeted]; Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About
Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 257-60
(2003) [hereinafter Heminway, Observations].
53. Complaint at J 18-21, SEC v. Stewart, 03 CV 4070 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. June 4,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8169.htm.
54. Id.T21.
55. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233 ("[N]either the Congress nor the Commission ever
has adopted a parity-of-information rule.").
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tion or its securities." This kind of trading deceives those who trust the
holder of the material nonpublic information-those who trust the holder
not to use the information improperly and selectively for his or her or its
advantage. The deception caused by the breach of this kind of duty clearly
is rooted in unfairness. However, its version of unfairness, as played out in
U.S. insider trading regulation, is less transparent and more difficult to
prove than the simple unfairness that exists when any person (or a specified
person) in possession of material nonpublic information neither discloses
the information to all in the market nor refrains from trading.
The public (unsurprisingly) finds U.S. insider trading regulation difficult to understand,57 and journalist descriptions often indicate a public belief
that insider trading violations are predicated on the simple unfairness that
exists when those who are privileged to possess material nonpublic information due to their relationship to the corporation engage in securities transactions for their personal benefit or with some element of secrecy." In other
words, the public perception may be that the broad form of unfairness-that
created by general information asymmetries-is the basis for insider trading
liability. Consequently, some market participants may not even be aware
that they have a duty that may restrict them from trading. Moreover, the
public misunderstands the basis for and outcomes of many of the highly
publicized enforcement actions taken by public officials at the U.S. Department of Justice and the SEC. These misapprehensions about the basis
for regulating insider trading in the United States and the effects they create
may have the tendency to erode public confidence in the securities markets
over time, even if there continues to be a (sometimes false) perception of
protection under current law.

56. Id. at 230 ("[S]ilence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may
operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) . . .. But such liability is premised upon a duty
to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.").
57. Why Insider Trading is Hard to Define, Prove and Prevent,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Nov. 11, 2009, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle.cfm?
articleid=2379.
58. Alexander Gendzier, The Cuban Insider Trading Case, MONDAQ, Aug. 5, 2009,
42
18 (referring to "the general
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=8
understanding of insider trading that, while in possession of material, nonpublic information,
one must either refrain from trading or disclose the material, nonpublic information"). Inaccurate and overly simplistic statements in the press about the nature of the insider trading
prohibition abound. See, e.g., Katy Marquardt, Insider Trading: What DidMark Cuban Do?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/money/blogs/newmoney/2008/11/17/insider-trading-what-did-mark-cuban-do ("[I]nsider trading is illegal
when a person stealthily trades stock on information not available to the public."); Ted Sickinger, Merix Analyst Faces SEC Charges,OREGONIAN, July 27, 2005, at DO1 ("Insider trading is illegal when someone trades on information that is unavailable to the general public.").
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There is evidence in lower-court decisions and administrative actions
that the requirement of a breach of fiduciary duty is eroding." Still, some
lower courts are continuing to enforce the duty requirement as the law of the
land, and trial courts and appellate courts may differ in their perspectives on
this issue.' This uncertainty confuses matters further. To the extent that a
breach of duty is not required for deception (and therefore potential liability) in actions for insider trading under Rule lOb-5, a new basis for insider
trading liability would have to be constructed.
The SEC's insider trading action against Martha Stewart was settled
before trial. Yet, it is apparent from the allegations of the SEC in its complaint' that the SEC continues to cling to a breach of duty as the foundation
for the requisite deception in an insider trading claim under Section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5.
B. Although the Elements of a Violation of God's Forbidden-FruitConsumption Rule Are Simple and Clear, the Elements of a U.S. Insider
Trading Violation Are Not
Having established that the basis for regulation is unclear both as to
consumption of the forbidden fruit and impermissible insider trading, I then
must note that the two rules are stated with differing levels of precision and
focus. Specifically, I contrast the simplicity and clarity of God's rule prohibiting ingestion of the forbidden fruit with the complexity and elusiveness
of U.S. insider trading prohibitions. A simple and clear rule-one with little
need for interpretive enhancement-is easier to understand and follow, even
if its legitimacy may be questioned in the absence of a definite regulatory
basis. God's rule may be described in this way. The ambiguous basis for
U.S. insider trading regulation under Rule lOb-5, however, combines with
the somewhat convoluted components of insider trading liability to create
an untenable regulatory structure, resulting in failed compliance at the margins (where the behavioral constraints may be unfamiliar or misunderstood).

59. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of FiduciaryPrinciples, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1315, 1378 (2009) (concluding, based on evidence presented earlier
in the article, that "[d]espite the Supreme Court's insistence that deception by a fiduciary is
essential to the Rule lob-5 insider trading offense, a host of lower courts and the SEC have
disregarded this dictate when it forecloses liability against a person who has traded securities
based on wrongfully obtained information.").
60. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009); SEC v. Dorozhko,
606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
61. See supranotes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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1. The Simple, Clear Elements of a Forbidden-Fruit-ConsumptionViolation
God's rule is simple and clear. God told Adam: 'You may freely eat
of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die."' 62 Although Eve altered and embellished the rule when she related it to the serpent,6 its contents are not ambiguous. To violate the rule, all one must do is
eat the specified fruit. The size of the fruit consumed (or bite taken), the
state of mind of the alleged violator,' the existence of deception, a predicate
express or implied duty to a third party, or a breach of any express or implied duty to a third party are irrelevant to a successful claim that the rule
has been violated.
Moreover, it is apparent from the biblical text that Eve knew she was
subject to God's rule and that her conduct violated the rule when she ate the
forbidden fruit. She repeated the rule to the serpent (although, as previously
noted, not verbatim).6 ' But she allowed the serpent to talk her out of compliance." Notably, the temptation of Eve by the serpent is not contrary to
God's express rule prohibiting consumption of the forbidden fruit, even
though the serpent is a catalyst of Eve's violative activities-arguably the
serpent's conduct is an essential factor in Eve's transgression-and even
though God punished the serpent for his conduct.6 1 Perhaps God's punishment of the serpent for instigating Eve's noncompliance was His way of
creating aider and abettor liability. 8
62. Genesis 2:16-17.
63. See supra note 14.
64. Although I am tempted to address the serpent's role in Eve's noncompliance and
engage in the seemingly perennial debate about the serpent's ability to exercise free will and
the possibility, as described by John Milton in Book IX of ParadiseLost, MILTON, supra
note 12, at 272-78 (Book IX, lines 48-191), that Satan has entered the serpent and controls its
destiny, that part of Eve's story seems at best tangential to the main thesis of the parallel
stories of Eve and Martha Stewart told here. Yet, it does seem significant to note, even
though it is irrelevant to a breach of God's rule prohibiting consumption of the forbidden
fruit that Eve willfully ate the forbidden fruit and the serpent willfully and purposefully
instigated Eve's actions. See generally Sarah R. Morrison, The Accommodating Serpent and
God's Grace in Paradise Lost, 49 STUD. ENG. LITERATURE 173 (2009) (analyzing the role of
the serpent in Milton's ParadiseLost using biblical text and related commentary).
65. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
66. Genesis 3:4-5.
67. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68. Under Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in actions brought
by the SEC:
[A]ny person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in
violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under
this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent
as the person to whom such assistance is provided.
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Finally, it is important to note that God's prohibition of ingestion of
the forbidden fruit is a rule created, modified, communicated, and enforced
by a solitary leader-a single Being. The process for rule creation, modification, communication, and enforcement in this environment is apolitical,
non-deliberative, unrepresentative, and (as a result) can be relatively rapid,
comprehensive, straightforward, and conclusive.
2. The Complex, UnclearElements of an Insider Trading Violation
Unlike God's rule forbidding consumption of the forbidden fruit, the
insider trading prohibitions established by Congress and the SEC lack simplicity and clarity. Specifically, the elements necessary to prove an insider
trading violation can be frustratingly imprecise in their content, largely because they emanate from a broad-based antifraud rule. Neither Section
10(b) nor Rule 1Ob-5 includes the elements of a successful public or private
insider trading (or other securities fraud) claim; both the statute and the rule
are broadly phrased and, through case law interpreting the statute and rule,
encompass a wide variety of conduct.
Since the elements of an insider trading violation under Section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5 largely have been and continue to be judicially constructed
over time in response to specific facts presented to the federal courts,69 some
of the elements lack precision or, as applied to specific, untested fact situations, permit more than one possible legal conclusion. In addition, federal
courts in different circuits do not always agree on the appropriate formulation or interpretation of an element, and the Supreme Court is not always
willing to grant certiorarito resolve these circuit splits. Accordingly, market participants like Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic may not always
know whether their conduct is regulated by or noncompliant with applicable
law.
Moreover, because insider trading regulation is shaped by Congress,
the SEC, and the federal courts and because enforcement may occur in SEC
administrative actions, civil actions (both private and public), and criminal
actions, the creation, modification, communication, and enforcement of
insider trading prohibitions may be political, deliberative, representative,
15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006). One scholarly text hypothesizes that there are two reasons why
the serpent is punished: "because he is bound by natural necessity" or as an "accommodation" to Adam and Eve. See Morrison,supra note 64, at 190.
69. Two significant exceptions exist to this generalization. In 2000, the SEC
adopted two important rules relating to the elements of insider trading claims under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. In Rule 10b5-1, the SEC clarifies what it means for an insider to trade
"on the basis of' material nonpublic information, adopting an "awareness" standard. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2010). In Rule 10b5-2, the SEC describes three nonexclusive relationships that create duties of trust and confidence that may form the basis of insider trading
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b).
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slow, incremental, multifaceted, and inconclusive. The relevant actors have
spent over forty years fleshing out the elements of insider trading,"o but all
of this activity has led to little certainty and predictability in the application
of some of these elements to certain specific facts.
Among my favorite unclear aspects of U.S. insider trading doctrine
under current law are: (1) the materiality standard (only the awareness of
material nonpublic information triggers potential liability); (2) the requirement that an insider act with scienter-a specified state of mind; (3) the
nature of the duty that, if breached, may lead to insider trading liability; and
(4) the requirement that a breach of duty be deceptive to trigger insider trading liability. At the risk of overstating my case on the complexity and opaqueness of the elements of insider trading claims under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, I will briefly address each of these four unclear aspects of U.S.
insider trading regulation in turn and indicate how the uncertainties interact
with the known facts regarding Martha Stewart's alleged insider trading.
a. Materiality
Eve violates God's rule whether she takes a small bite of the forbidden
fruit or a large one; whether she consumes a small piece of the forbidden
fruit or a large one. But tipping and trading are only contrary to law if material nonpublic information is used or shared. I have written at length
about the vagaries of materiality in U.S. insider trading before." I also have
commented on the specific lack of clarity of the materiality standard as applied to the publicly released facts of the Martha Stewart insider trading
case in a prior work, questioning both whether the type of information and
the quality of the information-noncorporate information about an executive officer's family stock sales-make the information in Stewart's posses-

70. Basic standards governing liability for insider trading under Section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5 were first enunciated in an SEC administrative action decided over 48 years ago.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
71. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context ofInsider Trading: A Callfor Action, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1131 (2003). I am not alone in this regard. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, InternalizingOutsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REv. 313, 391
(2002) (referencing "the notorious uncertainties in distinguishing material from non-material
information"); Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of "Materiality" Under US.
FederalSecurities Laws, 40 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 661, 663-64 (2004) (describing in summary fashion the elusive nature of materiality); Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient
Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. AND & MARY L. REv. 373, 386
(1984) (referencing "judicial uncertainty surrounding materiality"); Marleen A. O'Connor,
Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58
FORDHAM L. REv. 309, 364 (1989) ("[T]he criteria used in determining whether information
is material are vague .... ).
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sion material nonpublic information for purposes of U.S. insider trading
prohibitions.72
Materiality under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 is a mixed question of
law and fact73 and is defined based on a judicially constructed and construed
standard. There are two alternative formulations of the judge-made materiality standard: whether the information is substantially likely to be important to the reasonable investor in making an investment decision and whether the information is substantially likely, in the eyes of the reasonable investor, to significantly affect the total mix of information available in the market.74 Under these two formulations, it is not clear that information about
the Waksal family stock trades is material information. An expert witness
retained on behalf of Martha Stewart opined that this information is "not
'material' information applying standards of custom and practice as understood under the federal securities laws" because (among other things) its
importance (if any) to reasonable investors is unclear and non-specific." I
am somewhat more equivocal on the point, focusing on the "total mix" materiality formulation.
Without analyzing other facts available in the marketplace at the time the Waksal
family's stock trades were revealed to Stewart, it cannot be definitively stated that
the dispositions of ImClone stock by members of the Waksal family constituted
material information. The information shared with Stewart does, however, have a
propensity to affect the market price for ImClone securities, making its materiality
76
likely.

b. Scienter
Eve's state of mind and level of culpability are irrelevant to her violation of God's rule. She breaks the rule whether she negligently, recklessly,
or willfully eats the forbidden fruit and regardless of her purpose in eating it
or her awareness of the ramifications of eating it; God's rule has no express
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart: Insider Trader?, in INSIDER
49, 64 (Paul U. Ali & Greg N. Gregoriou
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Heminway, MarthaStewart: Insider Trader?]. For others, the materiality issue seems to be clearer. See Langevoort, Second Reflections, supra note 30, at 232
("Information that a controlling shareholder was secretly trying to sell off his own and family
shares does seem to be the sort that a reasonable investor would likely consider importantthe legal test for materiality."); Langevoort, FirstReflections, supra note 30, at 11 (same).
73. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). Although TSC is a
proxy fraud case brought under Rule 14a-9 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, its
materiality standard was later adopted for use under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
74. BasicInc., 485 U.S. at 231-32.
75. DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES,
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 555-58 (2009) (citation omitted).
76. Heminway, Martha Stewart: Insider Trader?,supra note 72, at 64.
72.

TRADING: GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ANALYSIS

1034

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2009:1017

scienter requirement. (Of course, Eve ate the fruit willfully, so even if there
were a scienter requirement, Eve would have violated God's rule.)
Insider trading rules under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are only violated, however, when actions are taken with scienter. Unfortunately, this
required state of mind for insider trading violations, like materiality, is fundamentally unclear. Perhaps what is most clear is that a violator must be
more than a merely negligent actor." However, the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the precise standard for scienter and whether gross negligence, severe negligence, recklessness, or some form of willfulness or intentionality is a sufficient standard for the imposition of liability.
Professor Donald Langevoort writes eloquently and plainly about the
ambiguities associated with the scienter requirement under Section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5, including the ambiguities associated with scienter in the
Martha Stewart criminal securities fraud action and insider trading case."
He generally notes that, in evaluating a prospective or actual defendant's
state of mind, the weight of authority provides that a court should assess not
whether the defendant's motivation or purpose" was to deceive (as some
courts contend),o but rather whether the defendant was aware--or could
appreciate or foresee-that his, her, or its conduct would be substantially
likely to be important to investors in making purchase or sale decisions."
Stated in recognized legal terminology, the court should evaluate whether
the alleged insider trader tipped or traded in reckless disregard of the propensity of his actions to mislead sellers or purchasers of securities.82
Professor Langevoort also points out that scienter issues in insider
trading cases under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 have been particularly
77. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) ("[T]he term
'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.").
78. See Langevoort, Second Reflections, supra note 30, at 228-29; Langevoort, First
Reflections, supra note 30, at 5-8.
79. Motive, purpose, and standards of conduct (negligence, recklessness, intentionality, etc.) are common legal themes (especially in criminal law) that are easily illuminated
through the study of law and literature. See MORAWETZ, supra note 8, at 265-355 (introducing recklessness, intentionality, motive, purpose, and other components of the criminal state
of mind and using a law and literature approach to describe related issues).
80. The "purpose" test seemingly was used by the judge in acquitting Martha Stewart on charges of criminal securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in a related
action based on public representations made by Stewart in connection with the insider trading inquiry and investigation. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) ("I hold that a reasonable juror could not, without resorting to speculation and surmise,
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart's purpose was to influence the market in MSLO
securities.").
81. Langevoort, Second Reflections, supra note 30, at 228 (citing A USA Life Ins. Co.
v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000)); Langevoort, FirstReflections, supra note
30, at 6 (same).
82. Langevoort, Second Reflections, supranote 30, at 231; Langevoort, FirstReflections, supra note 30, at 9.
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thorny, describing the "use versus possession" debate-whether a defendant
must have used material nonpublic information in her possession in trading
or whether the mere possession of the information is enough." SEC rulemaking settled this debate in favor of an "awareness standard"-like that
described above for other (non-insider trading) actions under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5.84
Under this test, Professor Langevoort finds satisfaction of the scienter
element of the insider trading case against Martha Stewart somewhat problematic. In particular, he notes that Stewart may have mistakenly thought
that the information about the Waksal family's ImClone stock sales already
was public information and that this fact (manifested in multiple ways) may
present Stewart with a defense based on a lack of scienter."
Whether this is a successful defense as a matter of law is a bit murky.....
I . . Stewart's actions may have fallen short of at least the spirit of the scienter
requirement under Rule lOb-5, which requires conscious awareness. And even if
she did act with scienter . . ., we see a consequence that might be somewhat troubling: people can be guilty of insider trading even under circumstances that evidence
a very low level of moral culpability. . . . My impression that Stewart may have
lacked a contemporaneous appreciation that this was illegal insider trading is sup86
ported by her own lack of any effort whatsoever to conceal the trading.

And Martha Stewart's culpable state of mind is less clear if it is viewed
through the lens of her purpose or motive. Was Stewart merely trying to rid
herself of another problematic personal investment when she sold her ImClone shares? Was she even thinking about other ImClone investors (no
less acting with a purpose or motive to deceive them)?
Scienter is also an element of the claim against Peter Bacanovic as
Martha Stewart's alleged tipper. Bacanovic had more knowledge than Stewart regarding the nonpublic nature of Waksal's stock sales. He must have
known-even though he also was out of town when the call was made to
Stewart-that information about the Waksal family sales was not then
available in the public markets." He may well have acted in reckless disre83. Langevoort, Second Reflections, supranote 30, at 234; Langevoort, FirstReflections, supra note 30, at 13.
84.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2010).
85. Langevoort, Second Reflections, supra note 30, at 234-35; Langevoort, First
Reflections, supra note 30, at 13-14. Significant stock sales by Waksal, an affiliate of ImClone within the meaning of Rule 144(a)(1) under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended,
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1), typically would be reported on a Form 144 at or prior to the time
of sale. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(h) (2010). See also Heminway, Martha Stewart: Insider Trader?, supra note 72, at 65 (noting, among other things, that Martha Stewart may not have had
the requisite scienter because she may have believed that the information about the Waksal
family stock trades already had been made public).
86. Langevoort, Second Reflections, supra note 30, at 235; Langevoort, FirstReflections, supra note 30, at 14-15.
87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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gard of the fact that the information he was conveying to Stewart has a propensity to affect investor behavior. Yet, if proof of scienter is based on purpose or motive (the minority rule used by the judge in Stewart's criminal
securities fraud trial), the matter is less clear.
c. Nature of Requisite Duty
No complex analysis of duties to third parties (those other than the rulemaker) is required in assessing Eve's breach of God's rule forbidding consumption of the forbidden fruit, since the existence of duties of this kind are
not elements necessary to a violation of God's rule. However, sophisticated
duty analyses may be required to establish insider trading liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. Although the existence and breach of a duty
of trust and confidence is required in order for insider trading liability to
attach to a trader or tipper, the precise nature of that duty of trust and confidence is unclear." Cases have explored, among other things, who is considered to be a constructive or temporary insider for purposes of classical
insider trading liability arising out of a duty of trust and confidence" and
what constitutes a duty of trust and confidence in misappropriation cases.90
As to the latter duty concern, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2, which "provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a
duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the 'misappropriation' theory of
88. See generally Michael G. Capeci, Note, SEC Rule 1Ob5-2: A Callfor Revitalizing the Commission'sEfforts in the War on Insider Trading,37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 805 (2009)
(describing the origins and continuation of the "duty problem" in insider trading jurisprudence and rulemaking).
89. The Dirks Court described this overall concept.
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for
recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). See also Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679
F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Insider status is normally reserved for officers, directors,
controlling shareholders of a corporation or to those having a special relationship affording
access to inside information. The test to determine insider status is whether the person has
access to confidential information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone." (citations omitted)); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp.
1397, 1402 (C.D. Cal. 1983) ("Although corporate insiders are traditionally defined as officers, directors and controlling shareholders of the corporation, a consistent body of case law
makes clear that the scope of the concept 'insider' is flexible ..... [T]he prohibition against
insider trading is directed at 'those persons who are in a special relationship with the company and privy to its internal affairs."').
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2010).

Winter]

MarthaStewart and the ForbiddenFruit

1037

insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule l0b-5.'1r These
circumstances include the following:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and
the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably
should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information
expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his
or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither
knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the
information expected that the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the con92
fidentiality of the information.

The recent insider trading case brought by the SEC against Mark Cuban"
raises issues about the nature of the duty of trust and confidence that must
be breached in order to establish misappropriation liability and the breadth
of Rule 10b5-2. Specifically, the case challenges whether any agreement to
maintain information in confidence creates a duty of trust and confidence
that may be a basis for insider trading liability. The CEO of a Canadian
corporation with securities traded through the Nasdaq Stock Market asserts
that Cuban agreed to maintain information about a future proposed securities offering (a private investment in public equity, or PIPE) in confidence,
although Cuban denies he agreed to maintain the information in confidence." The SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Cuban for
insider trading based on Cuban's sale of all his shares in the corporation
before information about the offering was made public." The trial court
dismissed the SEC's action against Cuban, finding that even if Cuban had
agreed to confidentiality, a mere agreement to maintain confidentiality of
information does not give rise to the "fiduciary or fiduciary-like" relationship that creates a duty of trust and confidence under the misappropriation
doctrine. "Where misappropriation theory liability is predicated on an
agreement,... a person must ... agree to maintain the confidentiality of the
information and not to trade on or otherwise use it. Absent a duty not to use
the information for personal benefit, there is no deception in doing so.'"'
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. (Preliminary Note).
Id. § 240.10b5-2(b).
See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
Id. at 717.
Id. at 717-18.
Id. at 725.
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The court also found that the SEC's application of Rule 10b5-2 to establish
the requisite duty of trust and confidence for misappropriation liability
would exceed its rulemaking power under Section 10(b). 7 The SEC has
appealed the court's decision granting Cuban's motion to dismiss.98
The predicate duty for misappropriation liability is also uncertain in
other respects. By adopting the misappropriation theory of insider trading
liability in the O'Hagan case, the Supreme Court indicated that a breach of
duty to a source of information is sufficient to support an insider trading
claim." But what if the claimed duty is not to the source of the information
(e.g., the client of a service business) but, rather, to a third party (e.g., the
service business, as an employer)? That issue would have been before the
trial court in the SEC's insider trading case against Martha Stewart if it had
gone to trial.1" If Peter Bacanovic, as the alleged misappropriator/tipper,
did not breach a requisite duty of trust and confidence (under the SEC's
theory of the case, a duty owed to Merrill Lynch), then Martha Stewart is
not liable as Bacanovic's potential tippee. I earlier noted in this regard that:
The SEC reliance on a breach of duty to a party other than the source of the nonpublic information is not specifically contemplated in the Court's holding in
O'Hagan....

97. Id. at 730-31 ("Because Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) attempts to predicate misappropriation theory liability on a mere confidentiality agreement lacking a non-use component, the
SEC cannot rely on it to establish Cuban's liability under the misappropriation theory. To
permit liability based on Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) would exceed the SEC's § 10(b) authority to
proscribe conduct that is deceptive.").
98. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff-Appellant at 9,
SEC v. Mark Cuban, No. 09-10996 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2010).
99. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649-66 (1997) (describing and adopting the misappropriation theory of liability for insider trading).
100. It would have been hard for Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic to make a
Cuban-like argument that Bacanovic's various duties (four, as set forth in the SEC's complaint) did not evidence or create a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship between Bacanovic and Merrill Lynch. See Complaint at 1 16, SEC v. Stewart, No. 03 CV 4070 (S.D.N.Y.
June 4, 2003). An employee, as the employer's agent, owes a fiduciary duty to his or her
employer, as the employee's principal, to act in the employer's best interest, including by
holding the employers information in confidence. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§

8.01 (2006) ("An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all
matters connected with the agency relationship."); id. § 8.05 ("An agent has a duty (1) not to
use property of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a third party; and (2)
not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent's own
purposes or those of a third party."). This may be a duty that can support an insider trading
claim. See O'Connor, supra note 71, at 333 ("Rule lOb-5 would apply if an employee
breaches a fiduciary duty owed to an employer when the employee misuses the employer's
confidential information in order to trade.").

Winter]

Martha Stewart and the ForbiddenFruit

1039

Although dicta and some of the reasoning in the O'Haganopinion may be applied more broadly to deception conducted through any breach of duty, it is not
clear that the Court intended or would endorse this broad reading.' 0

Ultimately, I conclude that the resolution of the issue in Martha Stewart's
case might not be important in the end, since Merrill Lynch owed a duty to
Sam Waksal, the source of the information (as Waksal's broker, his agent),
and Peter Bacanovic owed a duty of trust and confidence to Merrill Lynch
intended to benefit Waksal. In other words, Bacanovic did owe (through
Merrill Lynch) an indirect duty to the source of the information.' 02 Presumably, this connection would have been made at trial (or even in an amended
complaint filed by the SEC), although we'll never know. Regardless, continuing uncertainty regarding the identity of the beneficiary of the requisite
duty of trust and confidence for insider trading liability under Section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5 further illustrates the unclear nature of that duty under existing doctrine.
d. Deceptive Breach of Duty
Even assuming that the requisite duty exists and can be conclusively
established in court, a question remains as to whether, under specific facts,
that duty has been breached in a manner that constitutes the predicate deception under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5." The answer to this question
is most unclear, perhaps, in cases involving tipper/tippee liability founded
on a breach of duty in a misappropriation case. Under Dirks, the leading
Supreme Court case involving tipper/tippee liability for insider trading, the
predicate duty is breached when the tipper conveys material nonpublic information improperly to another, and a conveyance is improper when the
tipper receives a personal benefit in connection with the conveyance of the
material nonpublic information."
And under the O'Hagan case, a breach
of duty is deceptive in a misappropriation case when it "involves feigning
fidelity to the source of information."'o
The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes,
in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or
101. Heminway, MarthaStewart: Insider Trader?, supra note 72, at 60-61.
102. Id. at 61.
103. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) ("Not 'all breaches of fiduciary duty in
connection with a securities transaction,' however, come within the ambit of Rule lOb-5.
There must also be 'manipulation or deception."') (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 472,473 (1977)).
104. Id at 660-66.
105. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997).
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sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turnedtrader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.'o0

Among other things, the need to meet the personal-benefit requirement, the
nature of the personal benefit that may trigger tipper/tippee liability, and
whether the tipper must actually receive a personal benefit or intend to receive a personal benefit in giving material nonpublic information to the alleged tippee are unclear issues, especially where the tipper is a misappropriator rather than a classical insider (e.g., an officer or director of the corporation that issued the securities that are traded by the tippee).o' Certainly,
a misappropriator/tipper feigns loyalty to an information source when the
misappropriator/tipper accepts money or other valuable assets in exchange
for disclosing the source's material nonpublic information to others in
breach of the requisite duty of trust and confidence. But are there other
ways that a misappropriator/tipper can deceive those to whom the misappropriator/tipper owes that duty?'o Must the benefit be tangible'. and in-

106. Id. at 652 (citation omitted).
107. See David T. Cohen, Note, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the PersonalBenefit
Requirementfor Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REv. 547 (2006) (describing these and other related issues in the misappropriation/tipping context).
108. The Dirks Court is unclear about whether personal benefit is the only means of
proving deception through breach of the predicate duty. Although the Court notes the need
for objective criteria (plural), it equates these criteria only with receipt of a personal benefit
(using "i.e.") rather than noting that personal benefit is merely one example of the objective
criteria that may indicate deception (which could have been done by using "e.g."). Dirks,
463 U.S. at 663 ("[T]o determine whether the disclosure itself 'deceive[s], manipulate[s], or
defraud[s]' shareholders, the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the
insider. This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e., whether the insider receives
a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure") (alteration in original) (quoting
Aaron v. SEC, 466 U.S. 680, 686 (1980)). Courts are split on the applicability of the personal benefit requirement in misappropriation cases. See SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st
Cir. 2000); Cohen, supra note 107, at 561-65.
109. See SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he SEC need not show
that the tipper expected or received a specific or tangible benefit in exchange for the tip.").
The Dirks Court offers that personal benefit may consist of:
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
There are objective facts and circumstances that often justify such an inference.
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient that
suggests a quidpro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information
also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (citations omitted).
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tended?"'
Had Martha Stewart's case gone to trial and been considered by the
Supreme Court on appeal, we might have more definitive answers to these
questions. These questions would have been important to the case. In general, if Peter Bacanovic did not breach his duty to Merrill Lynch in a manner that constitutes deception, then Stewart is not liable as his tippee. Based
on publicly available information, while Bacanovic did not inform superiors
at Merrill Lynch that he was going to inform Stewart about the Waksal
stock sales, he also did not hide his conduct from his employer in any way.
In fact, he used another employee, his assistant Douglas Faneuil, to convey
the information about the Waksal stock sales to Stewart. One plausible explanation for this is that he did not think he was sharing this information
improperly, but rather in the ordinary course of business and for the benefit
of Merrill Lynch and one of its clients."' Both Merrill Lynch and Bacanovic benefit from that transaction in the ordinary course of business (by taking,
presumably, a commission or fee in connection with the sale),"' but this
type of benefit is not indicative of deception through an improper sharing of
confidential information. Bacanovic may also have benefited from a reputational boost by helping Martha Stewart out with information relevant to her
investment in ImClone, although that potential benefit did not apparently
motivate Bacanovic's actions."' Although Peter Bacanovic's disclosures to
Martha Stewart may have been in conflict with his duties to Merrill Lynch
and Waksal (unless Waksal approved the release of the information to Stewart) and inconsistent with some elements of professional responsibility and
ethics in the brokerage industry," 4 it is not clear that there is any deception
in any breach of duty.
C. Enforcement Activities Under Both God's Rule Prohibiting Consumption of the Forbidden Fruit and U.S. Insider Trading Prohibitions May
Be Unfair or Inappropriate
Part of Eve's penalty for eating the forbidden fruit and some of the insider trading enforcement actions taken against Martha Stewart are related
to the personal characteristics or status of the actual or alleged rule violator-characteristics and status unrelated to the actual or alleged transgression. This observation raises the question of whether these enforcement
110. In the portion of the Dirks opinion cited supra note 109, the Court mentions that
certain relationships suggest "an intention to benefit the particular recipient." Id. at 664.
111. See Heminway, MarthaStewart: Insider Trader?, supra note 72, at 62-63.
112. Id. at 62 (indicating that Bacanovic likely received a commission on the sale).
113. Id. at 62-63.
114. Id. at 58-59 (describing certain relevant professional duties and other obligations
of stock brokers).
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activities are fair and appropriate. I question the fairness and appropriateness of enforcement actions taken on the basis of a personal characteristic or
element of status of the actual or alleged perpetrator independent of the basis for regulation."' It would seem to be more just and fitting for enforcement agents to tailor their activities to the policies underlying the applicable
regulation and the nature and extent of the asserted harm allegedly caused,
unless the actual or alleged wrongdoer poses a danger to society.
1. Enforcement Actions Taken by GodAgainst Eve
Adam admits both his own transgression and that of Eve." 6 Eve then
owns up to violating God's rule and blames her actions on the serpent's
enticement."' Accordingly, there is no need for an inquiry or investigation.
God's sole enforcement actions against Eve consist of His punishment.
Although others raise concerns about whether God's punishment of
Eve and Adam is just,"' God's banishment of Eve and Adam from the Garden of Eden seems both fair and appropriate from the standpoint of both
retribution (in the form of "just deserts") and specific deterrence. By eating
the forbidden fruit, Eve abused the privilege God had given her of dwelling
in the beautiful, bountiful Garden of Eden, and in doing so, lost that privilege.
However, the remainder of Eve's punishment for eating the forbidden
fruit is gender-based and uniquely relates to her status as the only woman on
Earth-a status that makes her no more, and no less, likely to engage in
eating forbidden fruit."' "What do labor pains, lust, and subordination have
to do with Eve's sin?"' 20 By directing part of His punitive pronouncement
at Eve's roles as mother (pain in childbearing) and wife (subservience to
115. Punishment sometimes does vary based on the characteristics or status of a
criminal defendant, but typically the characteristics or status on which punishment is based
relate to either the defendant's culpability or the defendant's perceived ability to harm society. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposesof Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(2003) (describing trends in punishment since the beginning of the 20th century, including
the use of offender characteristics in sentencing in the late 20th and early 21st centuries).
116. Genesis 3:12; see also MILTON, supra note 12, at 216 (Book X, lines 137-43).
117. Genesis 3:13; see also MILTON, supra note 12, at 217 (Book X, lines 159-62).
118. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE GENESIS OF JUSTICE: TEN STORIES OF BIBLICAL
INJUSTICE THAT LED TO THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND MODERN LAW 37-38 (2000).

119. Of course, if Eve's wrongful conduct is deemed to be the seduction of Adam
rather than the consumption of the forbidden fruit, God's punishment appears more consistent with "just deserts" and specific deterrence. See Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 453, 470 (1995) ("John Calvin interpreted the account of Adam
and Eve as a seduction by Eve. Woman was subjugated both by God's law and as punishment for her seduction of Adam.").
120. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 118, at 36.
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Adam),'2 1 God's punishment no longer is based on a contextual retributive
response proportionate and otherwise appropriate to the harm caused-but
rather is based only on a brand of retribution or specific deterrence achieved
by hitting the violator hard where it hurts.'22 This form of punishment has
the potential of being disproportionate to the harm arising from the violative
conduct and may be interpreted as vindictive.
Worse yet, although the literal text does not apparently convey this
meaning, in actuality, God imposes pain in childbirth and subservience on
Eve and on all women.'2 3 This continuing aspect of the punishmentpunishment of non-wrongdoers-seems particularly disproportionate and

unfair. 124
Because God's punishment of Eve relates to her status as the only
woman on Earth, it may be designed to make an example out of her so that
her story and the continuing punishment would inform and deter both Eve
and the women who were to follow from disobeying God's word and committing sins.125 As the rulemaker, interpreter, communicator, and enforcer,
God has full enforcement discretion to impose any penalty on Eve, including a punishment related to her status. His enforcement activities are not
limited or subject to review by others.

121. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
122. On this point, two contemporary commentators on John Milton's ParadiseLost
note as follows:
In punishing Adam and Eve, God calibrates punishment to make it both deter further disobedient acts and rehabilitate the offenders so that they and their descendants will become obedient subjects. We are in the presence of Foucault's corrective or utilitarian model of punishment, in which the pain of punishment is set at a
level calculated to exceed the expected returns of crime, and thus deter (most) potential offenders from committing the crime, but is not so severe (as the death penalty would be) to preclude rehabilitation, or in religious terms, redemption or salvation.
Jillisa Brittan & Richard A. Posner, Classic Revisited: Penal Theory in Paradise Lost, 105
MICH. L. REv. 1049, 1059 (2007) (book review). Of course, under a reading of Genesis that
sees the consumption of the forbidden fruit as a positive force in the development of humanity, see supra note 47 and accompanying text, God's pronouncement is not punishment at all.
See Sally Frank, Eve Was Right to Eat the "Apple ": The Importance ofNarrative in the Art
ofLawyering, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 114-15 (1996).
123.
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 118, at 32.
124. See id. at 33-36.
125. Cf VICTOR P. HAMILTON, THE BOOK OF GENESIS: CHAPTERS 1-17 201 (1990)
("The point that is apparent is that sin and disobedience do not go unchecked and unchallenged."). For a similar view gleaned from Milton's text, see Brittan & Posner, supra note
122, at 1059 (commenting on the related passages from ParadiseLost).
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2. Enforcement Actions Taken by Congress and the SEC Against Martha
Unlike Eve, Martha Stewart never has admitted that she violated Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 by engaging in insider trading."' Yet, she did
suffer punishment as a result of the settlement she negotiated with the
SEC.'27 Assuming a transgression (which may be an unfair assumption), the
punishment (disgorgement, prejudgment interest, a civil fine, and a fiveyear ban on serving as a director or officer of the public company'2 8) seems
fair and appropriate as retribution and as a means of deterrence, based on
the nature of the allegations of wrongful conduct and harm.
However, the enforcement activities that led to the SEC's action
against Martha Stewart are more suspect. I have argued elsewhere that enforcement actions taken by various governmental players against Martha
Stewart may have been based on her public figure status, her sex, or her
political party affiliation, especially given that her case is marginal in a
number of respects and involves a small number of shares and a relatively
small loss avoided.'29 The facts as we know them indicate the possibility
that Stewart was targeted by selective (albeit fully legal) enforcement efforts that may have emanated from enforcement biases.
The system and enforcement of insider trading regulation in the United States
present significant opportunities for selective enforcement and the exercise of enforcement bias. These prospects for selectivity and bias arise out of both the unclear and imprecise substance of U.S. insider trading regulation and the relatively
unrestricted nature of the related multiple and overlapping enforcement
processes. 130

The enforcement efforts taken by the U.S. government against Martha Stewart, like those taken by God against Eve, may have been motivated by the
desire of a male-dominated (and, in Stewart's case, Republican-controlled)
enforcement structure to make an example out of Stewart-a woman, a

126. In a recent Nightline interview with Cynthia McFadden, in response to a question about whether Stewart ever thought that the corporation she founded, Martha Stewart
Omnimedia, would not make it through her legal troubles, Stewart stated: "I really knew that
I was not guilty of anything that could possibly harm my company." Cynthia McFadden &
Steven Baker, Martha Stewart Looks to Complete Comeback, ABC NEws NIGHTLINE, Nov.
18, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/martha-stewart-dishes-empireprison-rachel-ray-exclusive/story?id=9106551 (video and related article).
127. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. See Heminway, Targeted, supra note 52, at 3-42; Heminway, Observations,
supranote 52.
130. Heminway, Targeted, supra note 52, at 21; Heminway, Observations, supra
note 52, at 284.

Winter]

MarthaStewart and the ForbiddenFruit

1045

Democrat, and a public figure."' This is a well-known enforcement strategy: selective enforcement activities based on individual characteristics or
status, geared to enhance deterrence.132 Although the SEC's enforcement
activities (unlike those of God) are subject to congressional authority and
review by the federal judiciary, selective enforcement tactics typically are
constitutional and otherwise lawful.
The Due Process Clause does not prohibit prosecutorial discretion: prosecutors are free to bring cases against X rather than Y, even though they committed
the same crimes, or even if Y's crime is worse. The prosecutor might have any
number of motives: resource constraints and difficulty of proof, the value of making an example of one defendant rather than another, and so forth. The Supreme
Court has held only that the prosecutor's motive cannot be invidious, and this typically means that the prosecutor cannot have racist motives (for example) or want to
punish a defendant for asserting a legal right in a prior case. Although bringing
prosecutions for political ends would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause,
courts are so deferential-they require proof of the government's motive rather
than just a pattern of prosecuting political opponents who happen to violate general
laws-that there is no discernible restriction on this practice.
III. WHY NARRATIVE IS IMPORTANT TO THE DISCOURSE ON U.S. INSIDER
TRADING REGULATION

The comparison and contrast of Eve's story and Martha's story in Part
II amply illustrates a much-bemoaned state of affairs in insider trading law.
There is no single unifying theory of insider trading liability that has been
accepted by U.S. lawmakers-legislative, administrative, or judicial.
Moreover, there is no statute, regulation, or judge-made rule clearly and
simply outlining the conduct prohibited. The absence of a clear basis for, or
clear elements of, U.S. insider trading regulation creates problems for courts
and others who must interpret Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the insider
trading context. Securities advisors and traders-as potential violatorshave imperfect (at best) notice of what they may legally do,134 and public
131. Heminway, Targeted, supra note 52, at 15-18; Heminway, Observations,supra
note 52, at 271-75.
132. See Heminway, Targeted, supra note 52, at 4 n.16; Heminway, Observations,
supra note 52, at 253 n. 16.
133. Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and InternationalLaw, 55 DUKE
L.J. 75, 95 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
134. 1 earlier noted in this regard:
In all, the ambiguities surrounding application of Rule lob-5 in the insider
trading context are significant to the extent that they do not permit insiders and
those receiving information from insiders and others to conduct their securities
trading transactions with any degree of certainty that they will avoid insider trading
liability. If a person is in possession of undisclosed information about an issuer of
securities that is or may be material, the only clear choice for that person, should
she want to avoid liability, is to abstain from trading in the issuer's securities.
Heminway, Targeted,supra note 52, at 8; Heminway, Observations,supranote 52, at 260.
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investors-those who are ostensibly protected by insider trading regulation-cannot easily and predictably ascertain when enforcement is warranted and advisable. Finally, given the uncertain basis for insider trading
regulation and the unclear elements associated with potentially violative
conduct, enforcement activities may be directed inequitably or inappropriately-based on the personal characteristics or status of the alleged violator, for example-rather than the public policy objectives underlying the
rule or the nature and extent of the asserted harm arising out of the alleged
conduct. If the basis for and substance of insider trading regulation under
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 are clarified, enforcement agents will have
less opportunity to cloak their selective enforcement efforts-including
those resulting from bias-in the unclear policy underlying and elements of
U.S. insider trading regulation.' 35
Although many of these points (and the related details and examples
presented in this Paper) can be and have been made in other ways, I contend
that the juxtaposition of Eve's story with Martha's has utility in exposing
desirable and undesirable attributes of U.S. insider trading regulation, in
motivating related scholarship, and in teaching insider trading theory, doctrine, and enforcement under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5."6 The relation
of narratives about Eve and Martha enable the telling of larger stories about
the law.' 37 By relating the more recent, less well-known media saga of Martha to the age-old, familiar biblical tale of Eve, the capacity for understanding may be enhanced through, for example, a simplification of the morecomplex Stewart story (by reducing it to common and disparate principles
and enabling the construction of useful comparisons and contrasts).'38 In
135. Heminway, Targeted, supra note 52, at 21; Heminway, Observations, supra
note 52, at 284-85.
136. See Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 4 ("We use storytelling to teach our students ...
. However, stories can also serve a different function. In my search for a way to inspire and
sustain my own writing, I found out that a good story can be the source of a writer's motivation to both create and sustain scholarship.").
137. One creative law professor specifically illustrates the value of Eve's story as a
criminal law narrative in a law journal piece. See Frank, supra note 122. Another notes
generally that "[b]asing scholarship on a story essentially mimics the process that has been
occurring all along in the formation of the common law. Indeed, early scholars such as Cardozo viewed the law as evolving in precisely this fashion." Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 5.
The telling of Martha's story and other insider trading stories has the capacity to evolve the
federal common law of insider trading.
138. One scholar notes in this regard that law and literature,
and indeed other interdisciplinary areas, are useful to and appropriate for legal pedagogy because they provide a variety of heuristics, or learning tools. These heuristics enable our various law students to find paths to legal knowledge that works
best for them. This concept of multifarious methods derives from the rhetorical
copia, as outlined in particular by Erasmus in the sixteenth century, and gains
twenty-first century relevancy in light of legal education's interest in teaching to
particular personality types and learning styles.
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addition, the dual narrative format offers the potential of exposing new issues and offering fresh angles and perspectives on pre-existing questions.
For example, the two parallel narratives offer the opportunity to address a
number of issues underlying insider trading discourse, including the dangers
of an unclear policy or other basis for regulation,'39 the "principles versus
standards" debate,140 and the perils and benefits of multiple rulemaking and
enforcement bodies.14' Finally, by telling these two "law stories" together,
the narrator can better illustrate the contextual nature of law and legal enforcement. In the case of the two narratives presented here, for example,
the difference in enforcement structures (a single rulemaker, interpreter,
communicator, and enforcer in Eve's story and multiple rulemaking, ruleinterpretation, communication, and enforcement bodies in Martha's story)
creates a different environment in which to evaluate penal fairness and appropriateness.
Professor Kuykendall likely would dismiss this effort at joining business law and narrative as a mere evanescent vignette.'42 So be it. I contend,
however, that the meta-narrative elucidated here-the lack of foundation
for, clarity of, and just enforcement in U.S. insider trading regulation-is
worth telling one more time in a new way in an effort to illuminate, teach,
and foster change.

Pryal,supra note 8, at 5-6.
139. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: EcoNoMICs, POLITICS,
AND POLICY (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between PropertyRights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REv. 1589 (1999);
Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353,
353-54 (1988); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: an Analysis and Proposalfor Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairnessto Contract:
The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9 (1984);
Nagy, supra note 59; Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the
Death ofScienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147 (2003).
140. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescriptionto Retire the Rhetoric of "Principles-Based Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND.
L. REv. 1411 (2007); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DuKE L.J. 557 (1992); Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1287 (2006); Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague
Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism, Liberalism, and Democracy (June 14, 2009)
(working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1419683; Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985).
141. See Amanda M. Rose, The Unlikely Case for a Multi-Enforcer Approach to
Securities Fraud Deterrence (Vanderbilt Public Law Research, Paper No. 09-23, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1504158.
142. Kuykendall, supra note 1, at 612 ("[H]uman beings reside in the corporation and
will try to find a place in it for the language they speak about themselves. They deserve
support, but it is unclear who can provide it, or, indeed, if anyone has the imagination to
supply more than a few evanescent vignettes.").

